Concerning TGBMS, the following is a sanitised version of the RM’s timeline with regard to the formation of the void mortgage, his travails with the bogus authorities, the criminal actions at play and the latest developments in his quest for remedy and indemnification for his real property losses. It is long but enlightening and may be used by others to assist them in creating their own chronology of a void mortgage.
Whilst the names of those involved in the current action have been changed, those who acted in their public capacity are named. The Rogue Male is firmly of the view that the facts contained herein are a first-hand and accurate account of the circumstances as he currently understands them.
The Rogue Male has been homeless for THREE years now. He is, quite reasonably, somewhat pissed off at this state of affairs.
He is firmly of the view that all mortgages and evictions are unlawful and, in fact, amount to a genocidal attack against the indigenous people by those Masters of the ‘Dark Arts’ who form the ‘Crown’ and the bulk of the Rothschild-Zionist-Banking-Kleptocracy.
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
Rogue Male, CLAIMANT (C)
Duplicitous Solicitor, RESPONDENT (R)
Chronology of a Void Mortgage.
“The lending of money, on mortgage or otherwise, was looked on with suspicion, and the Court was on the alert to discover want of conscience in the terms imposed by lenders” ~ Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, 1913.
The provision in section 4 of The Statute of Frauds (1677) relating to contracts for the sale of land was repealed by Schedule 7 to the Law of Property Act 1925 (15 Geo 5 c 20), however the requirement that contracts for the sale of land be evidenced in writing was maintained by section 40 of that Act. Section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925 was repealed by sections 2.8 and 4 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 (c 34), however section 2 of that Act requires that contracts for the sale of land be signed and in writing.”
24 January 1989 ~ The Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay of Clashfern) addressed the House of Lords with his reading of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill [H.L.]. He stated the intention of ‘Clause Two’ (Section 2):
“The Law Commission recommended that contracts for the sale or other disposition of land should not be valid unless they are made in writing and that writing is signed by all the parties to the contract. The clause gives effect to that recommendation. It was made after wide-ranging consultation by the commission. It seems right that contracts as important as contracts for the sale or other disposition of land be in writing. The clause removes the possibility of an oral, binding, but unenforceable contract. It ensures that all the parties to a contract must sign it. The clause has been drafted so as not to interfere with the usual practice of exchanging contracts.” Hansard, vol 503 cc598-611
Wednesday 12 July 1989 ~ An article in the Law Society’s ‘Law Gazette’ addressed the changes to the Law of Mortgages: “… First, all contracts for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land will have to be in writing; it will not be possible to have an oral contract evidenced in writing. The danger of inadvertently creating a s.40 memorandum (for example, by a solicitor’s letter) is therefore removed. Solicitors could therefore discontinue the practice of making pre-contract correspondence ‘subject to contract’. As has just been mentioned, there is no need to prevent the letter being evidence of an oral agreement and although contracts could still be created by correspondence, a solicitor has no implied authority to sign a contract on behalf of a client.
Secondly, the signatures of all parties must be present; s.40 lacked this element of mutuality.
Thirdly, non-compliance with the rule will make the contract void rather than unenforceable, as under s.40 …”. http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/property-points
26 September 1989 ~ The LPMP Act came into full cause and effect; s. 2(1) prescribes that a contract for a mortgage is required by law, with s.2(3) stating that a document incorporating the terms executed by both the mortgagee and the mortgagor, is also required by law.
26 September 1989 ~ the implied contract in every mortgage deed prior to the 1989 act no longer has legal effect, on the basis that s2 prescribes that it can only be expressed in writing, signed by both parties, with all of the fairly negotiated terms in a single document.
31 May 1994 ~ Following discussion with Mr Robin Baron, the manager of the Mansfield Branch of the Bradford and Bingley Building (B&B) Society, an application for a Mortgage was made by Claimant (C) .
14 June 1994 ~ Facility Letter from B&B offering credit (the “Offer”), (Exhibit 11, ‘Offer of Mortgage Advance’)
16 June 1994 ~ C’s acceptance of Offer (the “Acceptance”) thereby creating an implied contract.
to create a “mortgage in the future”.
On or about 28th July 1994 when, in good faith that B&B had fulfilled its statutory obligations, before the purported loan of money, C, under financial inducement by Mr P Robin Baron, Bank Manager of B&B, Mansfield and under legal instruction from R, signed an UNDATED ‘Mortgage Deed’/’Charge’ without the necessary and required proprietory interest to do so ~ in so doing, and notwithstanding common practice, he effectively granted an illegal charge over a property that he did not have the necessary proprietory interest to convey. The Deed states on its face that it is to be executed by the “Borrower” and “Beneficial Owner.” The fact he was neither at the time he signed the undated deed and at the moment it was dated by R, renders it null and void ab initio ~ a fact that R was duty bound to point out to him and one that has only recently come to his attention.
Furthermore, R advised C to sign a deed which purportedly granted the B&B an irrevocable Power of Attorney, an unconscionable term that had C been advised by R of the full ramifications of such, would have had the effect of stopping him entering into such a void agreement and one which further vitiates the Deed. (Exhibit 2)
It is this mistake that lead to the mistake in the register being made on 22 August 1994 by the Land Registry and which he has been seeking (unsuccessfully thus far) to rectify by its removal since November 2009.
The signing of the deed and the deposit of said with B&B created an implied contract for a mortgage in the future, which was void for lack of compliance with section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, as it had to be executed by both parties, in accord with the Companies Act 1985, 36A Execution of documents: England and Wales and s.27(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002.
On or around 15 August 1994 ~ in an act of forgery, R inserted a date on the void mortgage deed in his own handwriting as “8 August 1994”, a common practice but nevertheless one which further renders it void. (Exhibit 1,void ‘Mortgage Deed’)
On or around 8 August 1994 ~ B&B purportedly created credit by way of C’s signature for the purposes of making an advance to C (the “Advance”), thereby purportedly performing its obligation under the unsigned Secured Loan Contract. (Exhibit 12, ‘Notice of Completion of Advance’). It is C’s contention that a negotiable instrument was then created by the mortgagee in the mortgagor’s name, under the power of attorney clause in the deed, in order to create the line of credit in the mortgage account, which the B&B claimed it lent to C from its own account.
22 August 1994 ~ THE REGISTRATION of the void deed & consequent MISTAKE IN THE LAND REGISTER. The Land Registry registered a VOID charge aka ‘legal mortgage’, Title NTXXXXX (the “Registered Mortgage”); created as a purported obligation under an implied Secured Loan Contract. Yet, without a statutory compliant contract, executed by both parties, the charge is void ab initio, on the basis that it was entered into mistakenly by the mortgagor who did not have the necessary beneficial ownership to execute the charge and without the mortgagee’s adherence to its statutory obligations, thereby doubly failing to meet the registration requirements.
22 August 1994 ~ Part B of the Land Register stated, “Proprietor: Rogue Male of XX Exeter Road, Forest Fields, Nottingham.”
22 August 1994 ~ Part C of the Land Register, the Charges Register, stated: “(22 August 1994) REGISTERED CHARGE dated 8 August 1994 to secure the moneys including the further advances therein mentioned. NOTE A: A date at the beginning of an entry is the date on which the entry was made in the Register. NOTE B: This certificate was officially examined with the register on 22 August 1994.”
The above referenced “REGISTERED CHARGE dated 8 August 1994” is a clear error due to the fact that the document was signed by C on or around 28 July 1994 and R himself dated it on 8 August of that year; ipso facto there was no ‘registered charge’ dated 8 August and could be none until it was registered, which in this case, was on 22 August 1994.
February 2, 1996 ~ COURT OF APPEAL, 3 WLR 372, UNITED BANK OF KUWAIT V SAHIB & OTHERS. Before Lord Justice Leggatt, Lord Justice Peter Gibson and Lord Justice Phillips. The Judgment states: “Section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, which provided that a disposition of an interest in land had to be in writing in a document signed by both parties incorporating all the terms of the agreement, abolished the long established rule that a mere deposit of title deeds relating to a property by way of security created a valid equitable mortgage or charge of the property without more.” Gibson LJ: “The effect of section 2 is, therefore, that a contract for a mortgage of or charge on any interest in land or in the proceeds of sale of land can only be made in writing and only if the written document incorporates all the terms which the parties have expressly agreed and is signed by or on behalf of each party. […] In the present case, for the reasons given, it seems to me clear that the deposit of title deeds takes effect as a contract for a mortgage and as such falls within s.2 […] I therefore conclude that by reason of s.2, the mere deposit of title deeds by way of security cannot any longer create a mortgage or charge.”
1997 ~ Approximately £1 billion of mortgages were securitised by the B&B in the name of Aire Valley Finance plc
2000 ~ A further £1 billion of mortgages were securitised by the B&B in the name of Aire Valley Finance (No 2) plc .
20 September 2002 ~ R and B&B entered into an agreement for a further loan of £10,000 (remortgage ~ account no. XXXXXX) with a repayment term of 21 years.
August 1994 ~ January 2009. The Mortgage repayments (on both alleged loans) were made, in good faith, until a final payment was made in January 2009. These repayments amounted to £67, 747.
Chitty (2008) 30th edition, page 417, clearly states: “iii. The effect of failure to comply with formal requirements – Effect of non-compliance…any agreement not complying with the requirements of s2 of the 1989 Act is a nullity.” It has also been held that the effect of non-compliance with section 2 applies, but not exclusively, to executory contracts, including [without limitation] those mortgage contracts which were entered into when neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee has a proprietory interest in the property concerned, which appears to be the case in the vast majority of the legal mortgages registered by the Bank.
29 September 2008 ~ the British government announced that the Bradford & Bingley PLC had been part nationalised and that the Spanish bank Grupo Santander had purchased all of Bradford & Bingley’s £20 billion savings business.
1 October 2008 ~ “UK Asset Resolution Limited” (UKAR) is the holding company established to bring together the Government-owned businesses of Bradford & Bingley (B&B) and Northern Rock (Asset Management) (NRAM). Together, the combined organisation supports around 722,000 customers with £75 billion of loans, with some 2,400 colleagues based at its main sites in West Yorkshire and the North East. UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) manages HM Treasury’s 100% shareholding in UKAR Limited.” Source: http://www.ukar.co.uk/ UKAR’s purported priority is to repay the outstanding £48bn government loan that formed part of the bail-outs of Northern Rock and B&B.
November 2008 ~ the government set up a new company, UK Financial Investments Limited, to manage their shareholdings in the Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley.
January 2009 ~ Following extensive research on the nature and common practice of the banking industry, including (without limitation) the Fractional Reserve Lending System, C had concluded that there was every reason to believe that the Bank had not, in fact, loaned him any money ~ there had been no “Advance”.
9 January 2009 ~ In good faith, C conditionally agreed to pay the new monthly mortgage rate upon Richard Pym, CEO of the Bank, providing him with the lawful bilateral contract and the individually negotiated lawful terms and conditions, along with the accounting of the alleged loan’s creation and any and all deposit accounts associated with said.
February 2009 ~ Richard Pym failed to provide said items ~ as a consequence, C informed the CEO that in the absence of a lawful contract, signed by both parties, he would cancel his Monthly Standing Order. C reiterated his willingness to pay any moneys he lawfully owed.
February 2009 ~ Carmel Butler Evidence to Commons Select Committee, Treasury [Exhibit 8]
March through to 14 July 2009 ~ despite repeated requests, Richard Pym, CEO failed to provide the requested proof of contract and any financial indebtedness.
1 April 2009 ~ Lifetime Tenancy Agreement between C and Lifetime Tenant.
15 July 2009 ~ Drydens Lawyers of Bradford, for and on behalf of the B&B began legal proceedings vs C at Nottingham County Court.
5th August 2009 – Richard Pym, CEO, Bradford and Bingley PLC was served a Notice of Conditional Acceptance of the alleged debt provisional upon the Bank providing a number of reasonably requested items in association with the creation of the original mortgage agreement. There was no response from said Bank.
5th August 2009 – Richard Pym, CEO, Bradford and Bingley PLC was served a Notice Requesting Adequate Assurance of Due Performance. CEO failed to provide any of the reasonably requested items .
6th August 2009 ~ B&B had repeatedly failed and/or was unable to provide the evidence that it loaned C any money and had failed to disclose the accounting of its losses pursuant to the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act of 1879 and in breach of CPR 36.
25 August 2009 ~ C filed a Defence and Counter Claim for GBP £389,145.15 at Nottingham County Court. It stated the reason for the Counter Claim, “1. There is no evidence to suggest that a legally enforceable original Loan Agreement is in existence between the parties. 2. The allegedly outstanding balance of GBP £30,353.05 on the account cannot be verified. 3. [B&B] Lien Debtor’s valuable consideration pertaining to the alleged debt can not be validated upon reasonable request.”
25 August 2009 ~ in breach of CPR 26.3(1) that states: “… When a defendant files a defence the court will serve an allocation questionnaire on each party,” Nottingham County Court failed to issue an allocation questionnaire, thereby VOIDING the proceedings for want of due process.
26 August 2009. At the hearing at Nottingham County Court, in spite of the counter claim which included a Notarised Affidavit of Obligation (one which remains unrebutted), His Honour Judge Inglis issued a consequently VOID order for possession in favour of B&B (Ref. Exhibit I , Order of Judge Inglis, 26 August 2009) and struck out C’s Counter Claim. This is taken as irrefutable evidence that the Court failed to apply due diligence to the facts of the matter – specifically the statutory requirements of the Companies Act 1985 (2006) and the LPMP Act 1989, the accounting of the Bank’s losses and the whereabouts of the original instrument of indebtedness, a valid mortgage agreement and all documents associated with the consummation of the alleged ‘Advance’. And in accord with CPR 31.11, the Bank had a duty to disclose the requested documents and the Court was remiss in its duty of care to the Defendant to apply said rule, a further ground for the order being declared VOID for want of due process. HHJ Inglis denied C permission to appeal.
3 September 2009. Accordingly, application was made by C to set aside the VOID order of 26 August 2009 on the grounds that due diligence to the facts had not been applied and the court had failed to provide a competent jurisdiction. This was struck out by Judge Inglis.
23 September 2009 ~ ‘Notice of Invalid Mortgage Charge’ is sent to the Land Registry in Nottingham.
28 September 2009 ~ C filed a new Claim vs the B&B for Commercial Injury (Ref 9NGxxxx) at Nottingham County Court.
29 September 2009 ~ His Honour Judge Inglis struck out the Claim on the basis it was “without merit” , in spite of the fact that compelling new evidence had been filed that demanded examination.
3 October 2009 ~ Application was made to change the register by removing the superfluous VOID charge at the Land Registry, Nottingham.
7 October 2009 ~ An N244 Application was made to Nottingham County Court to set aside HHJ Inglis’ order of 29 September 2009 is struck out by said Judge.
14 October 2009 ~ Mr Simon Naylor, the Assistant Land Registrar at Nottingham Land Registry is instructed by way of legal Notice and Application to remove the void charge on the basis that a fraud in the factum has been perpetuated by the Bradford and Bingley PLC. He stated in response, “I have seen no evidence that the Bradford and Bingley accept their charge is void. My view remains that it is a valid deed,” thereby demonstrating a fatal ignorance of the Law of Mortgages.
21 October 2009 ~ As Richard Pym, CEO, for and on behalf of the Bank could/would not provide material evidence demonstrating the existence of an enforceable contract, deed and/or loan agreement, all VOID ‘contractual’ arrangements were terminated by way of legal notice, in accordance with Article 7.3.4 of the UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 2004.
3 November 2009 ~ a further application was made by C to have the charge removed. Mr Philip Brown, Land Registrar, Nottingham stated, “I am satisfied there are no grounds for regarding the charge as void or for accepting an application to alter the register to remove the charge.”
17 November 2009 ~ Baroness Scotland, the then Attorney General received ‘Notice of Fraud in the Factum’ from C. It informed her by way of legal notice of his firm conviction that the (VOID) mortgage is fraudulent ab initio.
21 November 2009 – Under CPR Part 36, a good faith offer to settle (under protest and duress) was served on the CEO of the Bradford and Bingley PLC. This offer was refused by the CEO and his agents. The part 36 offer is prima facie evidence of the offer to pay – refusal of the offer is a breach of fiduciary duty under the rules of equity, the legal effect of which is to discharge any alleged debt under the provisions of s43 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.
8 December 2009 ~ Mr Recorder Scott QC failed to issue an order under Part 37 of the CPR for payment in defence of tender to be made into the Court Funds Office and in an act of bad faith, at the behest of barrister for B&B, Ben Wood, wrongly issued a void Civil Restraint Order.
26 February 2010 – C made an application to the Administrative Court for Judicial Review of Nottingham County Court’s various breaches of due process of law.
22 April 2010 – At the Administrative Court, Birmingham, having been provided with a final redemption figure of some £55,400, a good faith tender of payment made by C and refused by the Barrister, Mr Ben Wood, representing B&B. Mr Justice Wyn Williams was privy to the presentment and examines the negotiable instrument (a promissory note) in court. Said Judge wrongly ruled the application for Judicial Review was without merit as the claimant had not exhausted his avenues for remedy and appeal at Nottingham County Court. Acting in breach of s5(3) of the 1984 County Court Act, he issued a VOID ‘Extended’ Civil Restraint Order against C at the behest of Ben Wood.
27 April 2010 ~ In good faith, a further tender of payment in the same form was delivered to Richard Pym, CEO, for and on behalf of the Bradford and Bingley PLC, in a genuine attempt to bring about the full settlement and closure of the matter. There was no response from said CEO.
11 May 2010 ~ Richard Pym was served legal Notice of Request for Clarification as to the dishonour of said note. There was no response from said CEO. The Act of 1882 clearly states, “Section 43(1) A bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance when it is duly presented for acceptance, and such an acceptance as is prescribed by this Act is refused or cannot be obtained”; and, accordingly,
22 May 2010 ~ Richard Pym was served legal Notice of Dishonour and Opportunity to Cure. There was no response from said CEO.
11 June 2010. Richard Pym was served with Notice of Dishonour. The Promissory Note was not returned, thereby discharging the liability in accord with section 43 (2) of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 which clearly states, “Subject to the provisions of this Act, when a bill is dishonoured by non-acceptance, any immediate right of recourse against the drawer and indorsers accrues to the holder, and no presentment for payment is necessary.”
11 June 2010 ~ A Notarised Certificate of Protest, in accord with the 1882 Act, was presented and served, along with a Notice of Dishonour, upon Richard Pym. This, it is asserted, legally discharged the outstanding liability on the mortgage account.
7 July 2010 ~ An ex-parte hearing at Nottingham County Court, presided over by his Honour Judge Inglis, failed to take into account the fact that a lawful tender of payment had been made by C.
14 July 2010 ~ Another hearing, at the same court, presided over by the same Judge, again failed to deal with the fact that payment had been tendered in accord with the provisions and requirements of the 1882 Act and the Civil Procedure Rules. The Judge and Barrister, it is asserted, determined that the original order – in spite of its fatal technical defects – could be amended, some 11 months after its issuance. This was a breach of the ‘Slip Rule’ which allows for judgments and orders to be corrected up to 56 days after issuance. An attempt was made to attach a penal notice to the order but this was regarded as an ultra vires act given that a good faith lawful tender of payment had been made and refused.
18 and 19 August 2010 ~ Mr Justice Peter Smith presided over a hearing for application to appeal at the Court of Appeal in London. Notice of the hearing was given on 16 August 2010, along with instructions from the Civil Appeals Division of the High Court in Birmingham that no further documents need be filed for said hearing. The short notice (only received on 16 August 2010) and consequent lack of preparation time for C meant that due process was not followed. Mr Justice Peter Smith categorically refused to discuss the issue of payment by promissory note, on the basis that it was “preposterous”. This refusal to examine the facts in the detail they so obviously merit is – yet again – a denial of C’s right to expect due diligence and process from the Courts.
23 August 2010 ~ C’s barrister and lawyers were served a ‘Notice of Appeal’ in response to the draft order. Mr Justice Peter Smith was quoted by the Court Clerk, Miss Supriya Saleem, in an email sent to all interested parties: “Further in the absence of any exercise of his discretion to suspend the order for possession there is no justification for the stay of the order for possession already made remaining in place. He accordingly lifts the stay on that order for possession to enable the Claimants to enforce it by warrant for possession forthwith.” Thereby returning the claim to Nottingham County Court.
1 September 2010 ~ An order received from Drydens Lawyers was refused for cause on the basis that C was unable to consent to it because it was regarded as one made in error, since there were clear technical grounds for striking out the original order of 26 August 2009 and Mr Justice Peter Smith chose not to act on them.
6 September 2010. Bailiffs from Nottingham County Court attempted to serve notice of Warrant for Eviction (set for 7 September 2010)
6 September 2010 ~ An Emergency Application was made to the Administrative Court in Birmingham to have Order of 26 August 2009 struck out. At around 13.44, Andrea Lloyd, Court Manager at said court, informed C that there was no High Court Judge sitting at the Court who could deal with the application. On her direction, the application was taken to Nottingham District Registry.
6 September 2010 ~ At around 1555, the above referenced Emergency Application was filed at Nottingham District Registry. The Application included a request for a hearing.
7 September 2010, c10.30 ~ Mr Justice Butterfield, sitting at Leicester Crown Court, struck out said application without a hearing ~ an ultra vires act.
7 September 2010 ~ Nottingham County Court was notified of Application to Appeal the order of Mr Justice Butterfield to strike out the application to have the original order of Judge Inglis struck out.
October 2010 ~ Cousins Law of Mortgage (2010, 3rd Edition) affirms that: “Where a purported contract for the grant of a mortgage on or after September 26, 1989 fails to comply with the requirements of section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, no mortgage will be created and, notwithstanding any oral agreement or deposit of title deeds, the creditor will have no interest in or rights over the debtor’s land […] It follows that the failure to comply with section 2 will provide a defence to any claim for possession pursuant to a mortgage.” (page 610-611).
1 October 2010~ In an act of deliberate oppression, Drydens Lawyers applied to Nottingham County Court for a warrant for the committal of C to prison for contempt of court.
21 and 27 October 2010 ~ A two day hearing at Nottingham County Court of Drydens’ application for Committal of C to prison was convened. On the morning of 27 October 2010, there was another unlawful attempt to steal the house made by bailiffs from the Court.
27 October 2010 ~ HHJ Inglis, for and on behalf of the Court, was made aware of the Lifetime Tenancy Agreement between C and his tenant which was entered into the Court File, thereby informing all parties of the arrangement. Judge Inglis issued an order which stated that the tenant and Second Defendant, Lifetime Tenant, must be served Notice of ANY action the Claimant may take. As prescribed by the Mortgage Repossessions (Protection of Tenants etc) Act 2010, the statutory period is 14 days.
4 November 2010 ~ The house was unlawfully and violently possessed by agents of the Claimant. In breach of due process and the peace, no notice was served on the owner. The use of 21 police officers, numerous bailiffs and other assorted agents illustrate how the house was taken by way of violence and deception, with excessive force and coercion. Mr David Caress, Bailiff, failed to serve the warrant on the Defendants, Rogue Male and Lifetime Tenant, who were falsely arrested in their own home, kidnapped and imprisoned for 6 hours at Bridewell Police Station, Nottingham, before being released without charge. The actual eviction was marked by the use of excessive force, the endangering of C’s life and was unlawfully aided by the accompanying police officers, whom the Defendants have reason to believe were hired by the B&B to enforce the VOID order.
26 November 2010 ~ there was a hearing at Nottingham County Court for a claim of unlawful eviction, pursuant to the Mortgage Repossessions (Protection of Tenants etc) Act 2010, of an Application for an Order of Restitution by the Second Defendant, Lifetime Tenant. HHJ Inglis erred in law and dismissed the claim.
2 January ~ July 2011 ~ ‘BUYER BEWARE’ NOTICES were displayed on the boarded up property, explaining that to the very best knowledge of C, the house was stolen by B&B and that anyone interested in buying it should contact him using the phone number provided.
11 May 2011 ~ In the case of Helden v Strathmore, LJ Neuberger confirmed the statutory requirement for a 2(3) compliant “…contract for a mortgage in the future…”
19 May 2011 ~ A letter from Drydens Lawyers of Bradford, for and on behalf of the Bank, stated in response to a notice of intended action based on the Bank’s failure to comply with s2(3) LPMP Act, “The mortgage contract between you and our client was created by deed” ~ thereby confirming that there had never been a contract for a mortgage that satisfied the Lawful and equitable requirements of such.
June-July 2011 ~ The property was fraudulently sold to Mr Luce Bowells, who admitted to C and a witness that he had read the ‘BUYER BEWARE’ public notice and was cognisant of C’s claim that the house had been stolen by the Bank. Nevertheless, he decided to proceed with the void purchase.
The house was sold for c. £62k, some £40k below its actual value. This, it is averred, was an act of unjust enrichment by the B&B as, at the outset of the dispute in 2009, the remaining balance on the VOID mortgage stood at just £30k and said bank had received £64, 747 in illegal mortgage payments prior to January 2009.
23 December 2011 ~ The CEO of the Bradford and Bingley PLC, Richard Banks, was served legal Notice of FOS Complaint & Proposal of Alternative Dispute Resolution. There was no response.
20 March 2012 ~ Mr Luce Bowells was served ‘Further Notice of Intended Action’ in which he was offered the opportunity to become party to the Claim vs the B&B on the basis that he too had been injured by B&B’s misrepresentations.
31 March 2012 ~ there was no response from Mr Howells.
3 April 2012 ~ Ex Debito Justitiae Application to have VOID order of 26 August 2009 set aside made to HHJ Inglis at Nottingham County Court.
13 April 2012 ~ A Representative Complaint was filed by email to the FOS, along with the FSA, the OFT and the Parliamentary & Health Ombudsman, for the purposes of notifying each party to the paper on Emerging Risks & Mass Complaints, of the looming issue of millions of mortgages being void, there being no obvious guidance available on filing representative complaints.
18 April 2012. An email sent by C to the PHSO stated, “In addition, the nature of the complaint required that the PHSO give definitive statutory interpretations in order to help settle a mass dispute that in the case of the Mortgagors of UKAR involves some 722,000 British consumers of mortgage products, so it is both appropriate and expedient that the PHSO should receive these documents at the earliest juncture.”
16 April 2012 ~ Following the failure of the Court to respond to the application to have HHJ Inglis’ void order struck out, the application was re-presented to the Court manager at Nottingham County Court.
10 May 2012 ~ Notice of Request for Status of the ex debita justitiae Application was made to the same Court. There was no response. This is taken as a denial of justice to the C who informed the Court that “this will be taken as evidence of the Court’s refusal to deal with what is a most serious matter and a further attempt at obfuscation and denial of justice to C.”
14 May 2012 ~ Miss Whitehead, court manager, insisted that the Court would not process the application unless C made a payment. This was in spite of C being without a bank account, not being in receipt of any benefits and without any income. Miss Whitehead ignored the discretionary powers of the Court to accept applications made in exceptional circumstances.
15 May 2012 ~ under duress, an extortion payment of £45 was made over the Court counter and the staff are informed of the urgency of the application.
31 May 2012 ~ Notice of Request for Status of Ex Debita Justitiae Application and Orders Applied for was emailed to the Court, marked “Urgent”. There was no response.
1 June 2012 ~ a further request was made on 1 June 2012, via phone with ‘Mrs Reece’ who informed C that the application had not been processed but had been put before the listings officer.
11 June 2012 ~ As a matter of urgency, ‘Further Notice of Request for Status of Ex Debita Justitiae Application and Orders Applied for’ was emailed to the Court ~ specifically addressed for the immediate attention of His Honour Judge Inglis. It stated, “it is a self evident fact that on 26 August 2009, Your Honour issued a per incuriam judgment. Literally translated as “through lack of care”, per incuriam refers to a judgment of a court which has been decided without reference to a statutory provision or earlier judgment which would have been relevant.”
30 June 2012 ~ Having utterly failed to provide C with the lawful remedies to which he is entitled, Judge Inglis dismissed the application to have the void order struck out, illogically and erroneously claiming it to be ‘without merit’.
This response was a denial of justice that breaches Magna Carta 1215: “XXIX Imprisonment, & c. contrary to Law. Administration of Justice.” ~ “NO Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right,” and,
Article 8 of the Declaration of Human Rights ~ “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”
3 September 2012. Following the FOS’ failure to investigate the representative complaint, C wrote to Rob Deadman, Lead Adjudicator, Financial Ombudsman Service: “Thank you for the email of 9 August and the letter received 30 August 2012, the contents of which are entirely rejected on the following grounds: 1.1 The FOS has emphatically failed to take the appropriate steps to facilitate the progress of mass complaints, made for and on behalf of millions of consumers, which may represent perhaps the greatest emerging risk to public confidence in the entire financial services industry and its regulators. 1.2 The FSA has emphatically failed to regulate the mortgage industry, which has completely disregarded its statutory obligations as a direct consequence of this abject failure of the regulator.”
8 September 2012 ~ After almost 5 months of ‘investigation’, Rob Deadman, wrote to C in an email: “I write in relation to the above two complaints. I am the adjudicator assigned to initially review your complaints… As I understand it, you wish to bring complaints on behalf of all mortgage borrowers about the above two businesses. If I have understood this correctly, then I am afraid that we will not be able to consider either of your complaints in their current format. This service is set up to handle individual complaints from consumers about their own financial products. In this situation, you would both be entitled to complain about a mortgage that either of you held with either business in your names. Alternatively you could individually represent other borrowers, with their signed consent. However, a separate complaint would need to be set up in the borrowers own name, with a separate complaint form signed by the borrower, for each individual mortgage.”
This rejection by the FOS who claim they cannot accept mass complaints and that each of the 722,000 affected mortgagors should make individual applications, resulted in the FOS and FSA being declared to be unfit for purpose by C.
1 November 2012. An AP1 application (1) to the Land Registry was made for Rectification of the register and indemnification on the basis that the LR erred at law when it registered the void charge on the well-established legal basis that it was an illegal conveyance for the reasons expressed in the foregoing.
5 November 2012. Said application was returned by Land Registry without lawful and valid excuse for whom Rob Davison stated, “I am unable to accept [it] under the terms of Philip Brown’s letter to you dated 20 November 2009.”
10 November 2012. NOTICE and RE-PRESENTMENT OF AP1 application to correct the Register (2) was served via Royal Mail Recorded delivery on the Assistant Land Registrar, stating,
“Thank you for the letter dated 5 November 2012, the contents of which are rejected on the following basis:
The current application is substantially different from the one returned in 2009 and therefore the referenced terms of Philip Brown’s letter have no relevance whatsoever to the current AP1 application for rectification of the register.
In any event, the Statement of Claim and the Witness Statement, contain new evidence that has only recently come to my attention. To suggest that the application be rejected subject to the terms of a letter dated 20 November 2009 is self evidently unsustainable on the basis that I am providing the Land Registry with NEW information I have NOW and not relying upon that provided in the 2009 application when I was demonstrably unaware of the true nature and depth of the mistake I made.
To add further to the redundancy of Mr Davidson’s mistaken reliance upon the purported ‘terms’ of a letter from 3 years ago, your attention is brought to point 16 of the Witness Statement which references a section from just last month ~
“Further to that fact, in October 2012 ~ Chitty on Contracts 31st edition [paragraph #4-013 sub-section #70], in relation to mortgages, states, “ (the) contract is contained in a deed …”. It follows that the power of attorney [“POA”], founded upon the void ‘CONTRACT-by-deed’, is a nullity.”
Notwithstanding that, it is a self-evident truth that I did not have the equitable right to convey the title to a property I did not own at the time of such a conveyance, notwithstanding the common practice of doing so, and,
It follows that any suggestion that I had the right to make an equitable charge over a property which a). I was not in possession of and b). I had no right of access to, whether legal or equitable, express or implied (See Statement of Claim and Witness Statement) would be logically and legally fallacious as,
Equity will simply not permit a party to convey any right to that which he does not possess.”
12 November 2012. Said AP1 application was returned via Tony Holmes at the Land Registry, again, without a valid lawful reason.
26 November 2012. The application was re-presented and addressed to the Land Registrar, Christopher Mills.
A letter dated 5 December 2012 was sent by Rob Davidson, ‘Assistant Customer Service Manager’ who erroneously stated, “I have consulted the present Acting Land Registrar, Christopher Mills who has confirmed that the points in Mr Brown’s letter are still relevant.”
15 December 2012. In response, Christopher Mills was served NOTICE OF PUBLIC INTEREST & RE-PRESENTMENT OF AP1 application to correct the Register (4) which stated,
“The letter is an entirely fallacious response to the application ~ no justifiable reason is provided for the return of the AP1 and the blatant lack of such makes clear said public officer is evidently incapable of providing an appropriate response to the application, and/or is being used as a gatekeeper to prevent the application from proceeding, as is demonstrated herein. For the avoidance of doubt: the content of Mr Davidson’s letter would suggest the Land Registry is now claiming the following:
That I DID have the required proprietory interest to grant a charge on or around 28 July 1994 when I did not own the property, and,
That I DON’T now have the required proprietory interest to make an application to change the register when I do not own the property, when,
It is a self-evident truth that I did not have the equitable right to convey the title to a property I did not have ownership/possession of at the time of such a conveyance, a necessary prerequisite of the Land Registration Rules, notwithstanding the common practice of doing so, and,
It follows that any suggestion that I had the right to make an equitable charge over a property which a). I was not in possession of and b). I had no right of access to, whether legal or equitable, express or implied (See Statement of Claim and Witness Statement) would be naturally fallacious, since equity will simply not permit a party to convey any right to that which he does not possess, even under purported statutory authority.
In any event, the comments by Mr Davidson that you, sir, Mr Christopher Mills, Acting Land Registrar, “confirmed that the points in Mr Brown’s letter are still relevant” and that “Mr Mills has also advised that the issues you seek to rely on are not consistent with English Law and you do not appear to have grounds to make an indemnity claim” are refused on the following grounds:
His claim is erroneous as it based on a logical fallacy ~ an appeal to an authority (argumentum ad verecundiam) which cannot be reasonably sustained. To suggest this AP1 is not consistent with English Law is utterly absurd when the application’s legal basis so clearly exists ~ it is one made under the LRA 2002, the LPMPA 1989 and the Companies Act 2006. There is no basis for such an assertion and Mr Davidson provides none, other than the erroneous appeal to authority, whereby ‘Mr Mills said so, so it must be right’.
January 2013. The application was returned via Rob Davidson for a 4th time, “for the reasons previously supplied.”
28 February 2013. Following further research and the discovery of significant legal case law in support of the AP1 , it was re-presented (5) along with a Statement of Claim for Indemnification Pursuant to application for Rectification of Mistake in the Charges Register and served by hand on Christopher Mills, Land Registrar. It stated,
“The above referenced application of the Claimant for the removal of the entry made in the Charges Register in favour of BRADFORD & BINGLEY PLC [the chargee] under the terms of a purported contract for a mortgage, is made on the basis that the registered charge, which was not properly executed by the chargee, the Claimant now realises, was signed and witnessed by the Claimant prior to the date the charge was registered and before the property concerned had been acquired by the Claimant, as is the mandatory stipulation of section 23 of the Land Registration Act 2002, which clearly states that an owner of a property is the only party with the power to make a such a disposition.
In addition, the purported mortgage is void ab initio on the grounds that it does not comply with section 1 and 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 [Statutory Authority 1], section 44 of the Companies Act 2006 [Statutory Authority 2] and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 [Statutory Authority 3], as well as section 54 of the Law of Property Act 1925 [Statutory Authority 4].
Since no legally valid action can be founded upon a void or illegal action, the entry in the register must be regarded as superfluous, on the ground that serious errors have been made which must be corrected at the earliest opportunity, in order to remove the defects in the chains of title to the property concerned, for which the Land Registry must indemnify the Claimant as an adversely affected party.”
In willful defiance of the new evidence and cited case law, Rob Davidson, in letter dated 6 March 2013, stated, “your application and cheque are once again returned for the reasons previously supplied.” This was taken as further evidence that the Land Registrar, Christopher Mills, was derelict in his reasoning.
4 November 2012 ~ 6 March 2013 ~ The application was made to the Land Registrar on FIVE occasions and, on each occasion, returned without lawful cause.
27 March 2013. In good faith, and on the basis that the Land Registry had effectively pulled the shutters down on him, C, contacted Duplicitous Solicitor (R), his friend and solicitor at the time of the original conveyance of the VOID charge, to suggest that R make the AP1 for and on C’s behalf as R has ‘standing’ with the LR and, after all, it was R’s original lack of diligence and reliance upon common practice that caused the void mortgage to be registered, without which the B&B would have had no grounds for bringing a claim upon which relief could not be granted into HM’s Court system. The email stated, “in effect, the Land Registry is pulling the shutters down due to my lack of ‘standing’ within their system and this is one of the reasons why I am seeking your help.
Given that the application is based on the VOID mortgage as created between Phil Robin Baron and conveyed by yourself to the Land Registry back in August 1994, I am proposing that the application be re-presented by yourself in your capacity as solicitor at Lying Solicitor Firm and as the conveyancer at the time of the VOID registration.”
2 April 2013. R replied, stating that, “I’ve looked through the papers you sent but am sorry that it will not be possible for me to help – this is because when I acted on the purchase I would have been acting both for you and the Bradford & Bingley and professional rules mean that I would not be able to act for you now and against Bradford & Bingley.”
7 April 2013. C asked R to reconsider his decision on the basis that:
“2. It is self-evident that the registered charge of August 1994 was, as agreed by all parties, not properly executed by the chargee, the Bradford & Bingley. In any event, it was, under your instruction, signed, left undated by myself and witnessed as the ‘Mortgagor’ prior to the date the charge was registered and before I had the requisite proprietory interest to do so, as is the mandatory stipulation of section 23 of the Land Registration Act 2002, which clearly states that an owner of a property is the only party with the power to make a such a disposition.
3. Therefore, the purported ‘mortgage’ is void ab initio on the grounds that it does not comply with sections 1 and 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 [Statutory Authority 1], section 44 of the Companies Act 2006 [Statutory Authority 2] and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 [Statutory Authority 3], as well as by section 52(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 [Statutory Authority 4].
4. This is a fact that Mortgagees are now well aware of, as can be demonstrated by the attached exhibits [Exhibit 7] from Barnsley Building Society, Norwich & Peterborough BS (X2) and The Mortgage Works ~ which individually and collectively clearly demonstrate the required format of statutory compliant deeds necessary to create legal mortgage(s).”
7 April 2013. In the light of R’s refusal to assist, C reluctantly requested that R provide him with his professional indemnity insurance details.
17 April 2013 ~ Duplicitous Solicitor 2 of Lying Solicitor Firm replied on R’s behalf, stating, “Your email dated 7th April 2013 has been passed to me as Managing Partner … In short, please note that no liability whatsoever for your loss is accepted by Lying Solicitor Firm.”
22 April 2013 ~ C wrote to R by email,
“Dear Mr Lying Solicitor 2,
Re: your email, dated 17 April 2012, received with thanks, could you please provide, in accord with the SRA handbook, Chapter 1: Client care, 1.9, the written details of Lying Solicitor Firms’ complaint procedure and how exactly the complaint should be made.
I note with interest your comment, “In short, please note that no liability whatsoever for your loss is accepted by Lying Solicitor Firm,” and wonder how this fits in with 1.11 of said regulations, which states, clients’ complaints are to be dealt with “fairly”.
My question being, if you are claiming from the outset that you accept no liability for the loss , then how can I expect the claim to be dealt with “fairly”? ”
7 May 2013 ~ Duplicitous Solicitor 2 for and on behalf of R, stated:
“I am in receipt of your email of 22nd April 2013. Our complaints procedure relates to matters of client care, service and fees. It does not apply to allegations of negligence. If you feel that Lying Solicitor Firm have been negligent then I can only recommend that you seek independent legal advice and upon notification of any potential claim against us, I will put the matter in the hands of our indemnity insurers. ”
7 May 2013 ~ Clarification of Duplicitous Solicitor 2’s missive was sought by C who wrote, in response:
“Given the irrefutable fact that an act of negligence by a solicitor acting on behalf of a client directly affects the very ” client care and service” you speak of, the two cannot be logically separate and distinguishable. To suggest otherwise would appear to be a logical fallacy by way of non‐sequitur. Given a non‐sequitur is a statement that doesn’t follow from what went before, your email therefore makes no sense. Was it sent in error, Peter? If so, could you kindly clarify just what it is you wish to convey?”
11 September 2013 ~ the Letter of Claim, Exhibits and sworn Chronology served via email to Respondent and Duplicitous Solicitor 2 of Lying Solicitor Firm, Nottingham. An out-of-office response confirms the delivery of the LoC and accompanying documentation. It states, “On 11 Sep 2013, at 17:00, Duplicitous Solicitor 2 wrote: I am currently away from the office . I return on Thursday 12th September. Your e mail will be forwarded.”
20 September 2013 ~ following the discovery of a letter from R dated 28 July 1994, in which he instructed C to leave the date blank on the void Deed of Mortgage, the Letter of Claim, Chronology and Exhibits are amended and served on Duplicitous Solicitor 2.
8 October 2013 ~ On the basis that R had failed to acknowledge the LoC, he and Duplicitous Solicitor 2 were served “NOTICE OF BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE PRE-ACTION PROTOCOL”. There is no response from R.
17 October 2013, R and Duplicitous Solicitor 2 were served “NOTICE OF NON-RESPONSE and APPOINTMENT OF EXPERT WITNESS”. Duplicitous Solicitor 2 wrote, “I am in receipt of your email of 17th October 2013. Once again, I do let you know [sic] that I have not received any letters on 11th September or 20th September 2013. I acknowledged your email of 8th October 2013 on 9th October 2013 when I told you that I had not received any letters of claim.”
18 October 2013 ~ As no emailed acknowledgement dated 9 October 2013 was received from Duplicitous Solicitor 2 of the email served on him and R at their office on 8 October 2013 at 13:58:57 BST, it was requested that Duplicitous Solicitor 2 forward C said email in order to confirm it was sent. As of 6 November 2013, R has failed to provide the email, thereby giving rise to the lawful presumption it was never sent and that R was and is perverting the course of justice and engaging in insurance fraud.
21 October 2013: “Notice of Investigation” was served on R and Duplicitous Solicitor 2. The details of R’s professional indemnity insurers were requested for the SIXTH time of asking.
There being no response from R, on 23 October 2013, the Law Society was informed of R’s clear and apparent failure to adhere to the key principles by way of “NOTICE OF BREACH OF SRA PRINCIPLES” which was served on the SRA.
24 October 2013, “NOTICE OF SRA INVESTIGATION” was served on R.
1 November 2013 ~ a letter by email was received from R. Said email contained a series of misrepresentations.
5 November 2013, the letter of 1 November 2013, from Duplicitous Solicitor 2 was rejected in “NOTICE OF MISREPRESENTATION” as served on R, on the basis it was a clear misrepresentation of the facts and a further attempt to pervert the course of justice.
5 November 2013 ~ a phone call was made to the purported insurers, a contact provided by Duplicitous Solicitor 2 in the letter of 1 November 2013. It transpired that the contact was that of a law firm in Bristol going by the name “RPC” and not “Axis Specialty Europe”, the purported insurance company. RPC knew nothing about their address being used by ‘Axis’.
5 November 2013: In a phone call to the Law Society, Jonathan Scott of the SRA was informed of said misrepresentation. The SRA confirmed it would be providing C with the actual details of R’s professional liability insurance details.
Statement of Truth
I, the man known as Rogue Male, have personal knowledge of the above facts, am competent to testify to the above facts, and declare that the foregoing is true, correct and complete under penalty of perjury.
Friday, 6 December 2013
All Rights Reserved – Without Recourse – Non-Assumpsit
Errors & Omissions Excepted