Episode 31: A No-Show as Bailiffs Fail to Turn Up

A No-Show

Bailiffs Fail to Turn Up

In this brief Rogue Cast, I ramble along the disused Nottingham Canal and provide an update on the attempt by Nottingham County Court and its paid henchmen – the  bailiffs  – to plunder a man’s home on the back of a fraudulent possession claim and subsequently void order issued by a man purporting to act as a District Judge.

Whilst foreign immigrants get preferential treatment, the genocide of eviction, as perpetrated on the idigenous peoples of the isles of Britain via the Great British Mortgage Swindle continues.

The application was made under CPR 3.1 (7) on the ground that the DJ mistakenly formulated an order that was in contradiction of the facts before him.

It was served via email on all parties and by Special Delivery to Nottingham County Court.

This is a santised version of the application to have the void order set aside:

Served by email.

NAME OF CEO, NAME OF BANK (CLAIMANT) [email address]

NAME OF SOLICITORS [email address]

cc: MANAGER NAME COUNTY COURT

In the [NAME] County Court

________________________________________________________________

NAME OF BANK, CLAIMANT (C)

Vs

NAME OF DEFENDANT (D)

CLAIM NO. [XXXXXX]

_____________________________________________________________________

Affidavit in Support of Application to Set Aside Void Order

Under CPR 3.1(7)

NAME OF AFFIANT

DATE 2024

__________________________________________________________________

To All parties

I, Name of Defendant, of [ADDRESS], having first hand knowledge of the facts, make this Affidavit of Truth and say as follows,

1. Pursuant to the Order of NAME OF JUDGE AND DATE and facts of the matter you are hereby served this Affidavit in support of my application to set aside the enclosed possession order of [DATE].
2. It was established by the Court of Appeal in Tibbles v SIG Plc [2012] 1 WLR 2591 that exercise of discretion to set aside or vary an order under CPR 3.1(7) will be exercised in these circumstances:
3. (i) where there had been a material change of circumstances since the order was made; (ii) where the facts on which the original decision was made had been misstated; or (iii) where there had been a manifest mistake on the part of the judge in formulating the order.
4. In the case of the possession order of DATE 2024, it is my contention that (ii) and (iii) are both applicable grounds for setting aside the order.

(ii) Misstatement of Facts.

5. The first ground for setting aside the order is that the facts on which the original decision was made were (innocently or otherwise) misstated, namely that,
6. It is beyond doubt that the Claimant does not have the fraudulently conveyed Deed of Mortgage (the mortgage note) and has, despite repeated request, failed to prove it has the locus standi to initiate an application for possession and is not committing a fraud upon the Court and the Defendant (D). This has lead to a manifest mistake on the part of the judge in his formulation of the order on the basis that the Court has been informed of the fact and DDJ NAME mistakenly stated that electronic copies were deemed acceptable when I have alleged that the originating Deed of Mortgage was fraudulently conveyed.
7. Indeed, as I have repeatedly pointed out to all parties, the Claimant’s reliance upon photocopies of the fraudulently conveyed Deed of Mortgage, its false claim that there exists a valid agreement/contract as per sections 1 and 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 and that it loaned me moneys is a conscious and pre-meditated act of dishonesty, as considered by the standards of the ordinary, honest informed lay observer.
8. NAME OF County Court is bound to give effect to this application to set aside the order for possession, by way of the ruling given in the High Court case, Bank of Scotland plc v Waugh & Others [2014] – a mortgage will be void under s52(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, if it fails to comply with s1(3) of the 1989 Act; and,
9. The Court is also directed to the binding authority of Scott v Southern Pacific Mortgages & Others [2014] UKSC 52 – a mortgagor has no rights to grant before the completion of the sale and purchase of the property concerned; hence the instruction that the deed must bear the same date as the transfer of credit to the mortgagor, in order to give the false impression that section 1(3) of the 1989 Act has been complied with.
10. In said case, Lady Hale stated this point most plainly: “The purchaser was not in a position either at the date of exchange of contracts or at any time up until completion of the purchase to confer equitable proprietary,” and,“This case has been decided on the simple basis that the purchaser of land cannot create a proprietary interest in the land, which is capable of being an overriding interest, until his contract has been completed.”
11. Wherefore, the Witness Statements of NAME OF SOLICITOR, the C’s legal representative are dishonest on the ground that s/he has been informed of the facts of the matter and, in any event, has no standing to make any claim that there is a debt as s/he is not an officer of the purported lender, the Claimant. In support of which, see: Ulster Bank Ireland Limited v Dermody, [2014] IEHC 140 andACC Bank plc v Byrne & Others, Unreported, 31 July 2014, which held that the business records of a bank were inadmissible as evidence of the truth of their contents save where the rigorous provisions of the Act were complied with. 
12. Having been informed of the facts, the Witness Statement(s) of NAME, made for and on behalf of the Claimant, demonstrate her conduct to be dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
13. In the Takhar v Gracefield judgment each of the Lord and Lady Justices approved the statement of principle by Aikens LJ in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Highland Financial Partners LP [2013] EWCA Civ 328 at paragraph 106 ( see per Lord Kerr at paragraph 57 and Lord Sumption at 67). Lord Briggs and Lady Arden, who gave separate judgments, appear to have also agreed with this statement of principle: see at paragraphs 76 and 104 respectively.
14. What Aikens LJ said was: “The principles are, briefly: first, there has to be a ‘conscious and deliberate dishonesty’ in relation to the relevant evidence given, or action taken, statement made or matter concealed, which is relevant to the judgment now sought to be impugned. Secondly, the relevant evidence, action, statement or concealment (performed with conscious and deliberate dishonesty) must be ‘material’.”
15. The deliberate dishonesty goes right back to the inception of the purported mortgage when I was induced into signing a Deed of Mortgage over a property that I was not the owner of at the time of the conveyance. This, of course, may be rightly labelled an industrial scale fraud as it is the common practice relied upon by each and every alleged lender. The Claimant (NAME OF BANK in this case) – whose role was one of intermediate broker and administrator (who will never have a direct interest in the lending) – has been unwittingly authorised by the FCA to lend to a borrower but what it is doing is providing unsecured credit (deemed as a loan) to the purchaser for its fees to purchase the legal and equitable title of the secured obligations of the borrower. The secured obligations are therefore transferred for free directly to the purchaser, not sold.
16. My Affidavits of [DATES] establish that the Claimant and its legal representatives were made aware of the dishonesty of NAME’s Witness Statements and that each Judge had it brought to his attention and has mistakenly overlooked it. NAME knew what she was doing was dishonest by virtue of the fact she was made aware of the facts of the matter prior to the ‘hearings’. These facts were established by the Affidavit of Obligation, which NAME had knowledge of before she dishonestly made her witness statement and can be viewed in the court file.

(iii) The manifest mistake on the part of the judge in formulating the order.

17. This now brings us onto the subject of the mistakes of the Judge who issued the order for possession and of DDJ NAME who presided at the hearing on 17th November, 2023. It is my assertion that there has been no fair hearing on the ground that I could not hear anything: my hearing disability has prevented me from taking part in any of the purported hearings. By ignoring the fact of my deafness, there has been a manifest mistake on the part of the judge in formulating the possession order.
18. The order for possession is null and void on the simple basis that no meaningful hearing has actually taken place.
19. I have complied with the Court’s request that I provide material evidence of my deafness and, indeed, at the last hearing I attended on17th November, 2023, I was unable to hear virtually anything. In good faith, it is asserted that no hearing can take place if one party cannot hear. After all, how could I consent to an order that I manifestly have not heard and thus been unable to refute?
20. It was on this basis that I made an application to have Judge NAME’s order of 08 December, 2023 set aside. His assertion that the moving of the desk closer to his enabled me to hear was wholly rejected, as was his comment that I was in some way faking my hearing loss. The consequence of my hearing disability is that I heard virtually nothing of what was said and at no point was I able to take part in the Judge’s pronouncements on my application. From the little I could gleam of it, Mr Tate, the solicitor representing the claimant, made no submissions and, in the absence of which, it appeared that DDJ NAME made the error of practising law from the bench. A further fact that renders the possession order void.
21. Similarly, his ill-founded claim that the hearing loop was tested by court officers who have no hearing issues, is also rejected as being, legally and medically, fallacious.
22. Throughout the ‘hearing’ on 17th November, 2023, I repeatedly informed the court that I could barely hear and that 90% of what the Judge was stating was inaudible. DDJ NAME ignored my statements and insisted that he be allowed to plough on and that “we will do our best.” This attempt to ignore my attestation of deafness was self-evidently a mistake on his part.
23. In short, at every turn, I was denied a fair hearing on the simple basis that I cannot hear. DDJ NAME knew this and mistakenly chose to carry on regardless in order to dismiss my valid application for full disclosure.
24. Having had four hearings adjourned on the basis I was at a massive disadvantage, I made it plain that I could not and would not take part in any more proceedings until such a time as I am able to take part with adequate hearing assistance.
25. Under these circumstances, I motion the court to find that there has been no meaningful hearing on the basis my hearing disability has rendered me unable to hear virtually anything that has been said by DDJ NAME and the three previous judges. Therefore, it my contention that the entire proceedings thus far are null and void, ab initio, as I stated in Court at the end of the session on 17th November, 2023.
26. All of which was made plain in my application to set aside DDJ NAME’s order. Nevertheless, in contradiction of any and all Due Process of the Law, my application was rejected without reason.
27. Subject to this, I stated to all parties that I was demonstrably incapable of taking part in the hearing of [DATE IN JANUARY].
28. In the light of which it appears that a hearing did take place and that it is from said that the order for possession has been procured. This leads me to the reasonable conclusion that the Claimant has dishonestly taken advantage of my deafness and non-attendance in order to obtain the order. This breach of due process is on all fours with a breach of the Disability Act, 2010.
29. In any event and in such circumstances, DDJ NAME’s rejection of my part 18 Application of [DATE] for full disclosure of the original documents the claimant is relying on in support of its (fraudulent) claim is an error at law. In support of which, I cite Bracegirdle v Oxley and Canley [1947] KB349, in which Lord Bingham stated: “it is obviously perverse and an error of law to make a finding of fact for which there is no evidential foundation.”
30. The witness statements of Alfie Drysdale and Noreen Akif are inadmissible as per the herein listed authorities which makes it plain that only an officer employed by the purported lender can verify the accounts and the value of the alleged debt. Neither of the aforementioned employees of Ascent Legal have any first hand knowledge of the accounting transactions of the purported loan and are relying solely on hearsay.
31. DJ NAME acted in contradiction of what the High Court have confirmed. Namely, that banks are required to satisfy strict proofs in enforcing claims against debtors. The provisions of the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 (as amended) (the “Act”) provide for the admissibility of copies of entries from the books and records of a bank against a defendant as prima facie evidence of their contents.  Where a bank fails to strictly comply with the provisions of the Act, the evidence of the bank will be inadmissible in enforcing its claim against the debtor.
32. The facts and outcome of Dermody will be of significant importance to the purchasers and servicers of loans. It is, of course, my contention that the Claimant lost any and all rights of chose when it, on the balance of probabilities, securitised the purported mortgage note. That is why it is crucial that this order is not allowed to stand: the Claimant is merely acting in the role of collection agent and this is reliant upon a fraudulent conveyance, namely the Deed of Mortgage.
33. In Dermody the High Court dismissed the claim of the plaintiff bank (Ulster Bank Ireland Limited (“UBIL”)) in circumstances where the person swearing the affidavit setting out the bank’s evidence was an employee of a third party (which was a related company charged with the collection of debts due to UBIL) and had been authorised by UBIL pursuant to a power of attorney to swear the affidavit.  This decision is in line with the High Court’s decision in Bank of Scotland plc v Stapleton [2012] IEHC 549 regarding Certus, the servicer charged with the management of the loans due to Bank of Scotland plc.
34. The cumulative effect of these High Court decisions is that:

• The records of the bank are inadmissible save where the provisions of the Act are complied with.

• The evidence must be provided by an employee of the bank and not a representative of some other company to whom the task of collecting the debt has been outsourced.

• It remains open to the person in the bank who created the original document to give direct evidence. 

35. It is my contention that by mistakenly stating that there is no requirement for the bank to provide the original charging instrument, the fraudulently conveyed Deed of Mortgage, DDJ NAME demonstrated a blatant bias in favour of the Claimant.

No Disclosure

36. Further, his written order also contradicted what I was told by the witnesses who were present and will testify as such, that he stated on the day of the hearing that he would only dismiss two parts of the CPR 18 application for full disclosure and allow the rest to stand. Again this shows his extreme bias in favour of the Claimant. Unless the Claimant is put to strict proof of Claim it would appear it is being treated as though it is above the Law, a Too Big To Fail (TBTF) ‘protected’ financial entity and it can conceal facts which are prejudicial to its claim and vital to my defence, this would be unconscionable.
37. It is a central tenet of Law that the Court has to come to a fair and just judgement based on all the facts. In this case, I have been alleging the Deed of Mortgage was a fraudulent conveyance from the outset. As an Officer of the Court DDJ NAME mistakenly ruled that the Claimant did not need to provide strict proof of Claim, an error which has the effect of aiding and abetting the perpetuation of a fraud on the Court. The High Court have confirmed that banks are required to satisfy strict proofs in enforcing claims against debtors, which will have significant practical implications for lenders contemplating the outsourcing of debt collection and the purchase of loans.  The provisions of the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 (as amended) (the “Act”) provide for the admissibility of copies of entries from the books and records of a bank against a defendant as prima facie evidence of their contents.  Where a bank fails to strictly comply with the provisions of the Act, the evidence of the bank will be inadmissible in enforcing its claim against the debtor.
38. Source: Ulster Bank Ireland Limited v Dermody, [2014] IEHC 140 andACC Bank plc v Byrne & Others, unreported, 31 July 2014 which held that the business records of a bank were inadmissible as evidence of the truth of their contents save where the rigorous provisions of the Act were complied with. 
39. Of course, the reliance of the Claimant on a fraudulently conveyed deed of mortgage, a non-existent valid mortgage agreement/contract (as per S 1 (3) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1989 – the Law of Mortgages), the failure to provide disclosure of the accounting of the transactions of the alleged loan and its losses, as per the Banker’s Books Evidence Act, 1879, and a valid Power of Attorney, also stands as a manifest breach of the 750 year old Observance of due Process of Law 1368, section 3 which states:
40. “None shall be put to answer without due Process of Law. At the Request of the Commons by their Petitions put forth in this Parliament, to eschew the Mischiefs and Damages done to divers of his Commons by false Accusers, which oftentimes have made their Accusations more for Revenge and singular Benefit, than for the Profit of the King, or of his People, which accused Persons, some have been taken, and sometime caused to come before the King’s Council by Writ, and otherwise upon grievous Pain against the Law: It is assented and accorded, for the good Governance of the Commons, that no Man be put to answer without Presentment before Justices, or Matter of Record, or by due Process and Writ original, according to the old Law of the Land: And if any Thing from henceforth be done to the contrary, it shall be void in the Law, and holden for Error.”
41. Consequently, it stands to reason that [NAME OF JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE POSSESSION ORDER] failed to apply the law correctly. It is also taken as a fact that he is, therefore, well aware that Nat West PLC’s claim is reliant upon a fraudulently conveyed Deed of Mortgage and, consequently, the Claimant thus has no standing whatsoever to begin a possession claim.
    
    
42. In clear breach of said precedent, the DDJ mistakenly deemed that mere photocopies and electronic scans of the Deed of Mortgage were to be deemed acceptable when I have material evidence that said Deed is a forgery.
43. Further, the DDJ also chose to ignore the salient point of law that makes it plain that only a suitably qualified officer of the alleged lender and false claimant, Nat West Plc.

44. In accord with the foregoing, it necessarily follows that the enclosed possession order of [Name of Judge], is void on the grounds stated herein and must be set aside.
45. Therefore, the County Court is required to set its orders aside without delay. It must also be stressed that the court does not have the necessary jurisdiction to refuse to do so, as per the judgments of Lord Greene in Craig v Kanssen Craig v Kanssen [1943] 1 KB 256); Upjohn LJ in Re Pritchard [1963]; and Lord Denning in Firman v Ellis [1978] and that there must be a general adjournment in proceedings until such a time as I am able to hear satisfactorily and that the application for full disclosure be reinstated in line with the cited authorities.

Statement of Truth

I, the man known as Name of Defendant, having first hand knowledge of the above facts, am competent to testify to the the veracity of this affidavit, and declare that the foregoing is true, correct and complete under penalty of perjury.

Autograph ___________________

DATE

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FOOTNOTE: none of this is to be taken as legal advice. As I have stated time after time, the British Courts are a captured operation, fit only for the purpose of subjugating the Law for the benefit of the tyrannical state and its banking overlords.

However, should you be in a similar position – i.e a Court has issued a void order against you and you want it set aside, then feel free to drop me a line. Remember, a void order is just that and you have every right to have it set aside and/or refuse to accept it.

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Should you also be appreciative of my work, then please don’t hesitate to drop a few quid in the pot via the Buy Me a Coffee button.

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Further reading of the matters referenced in the Rogue Cast:

Car finance banking scam
False vaccination record